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I.
—
Dualism After Thirty Years of Controversy
NO more important or fascinating theme for a course of lectures
on the Paul Carus foundation could possibly have been chosen
than that which Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy undertook to discuss
when afforded that enviable opportunity. Professor Lovejoy be-
longs to the very modern school of philosophy which has called itself
for some years the school of Critical Realism, and his analytical
power as well as sound scholarship have given him a place of distinc-
tion in that school.
He was eminently qualified to review and evaluate a movement
in modern philosophy which for twenty-five years or more has chal-
lenged the minds of the most profound thinkers of Europe and
America—namely, the attack upon Dualism.
That attack has not been confined to the Idealists of the old
type. Thinkers truly and radically modern, men who are at home
in physics as well as in metaphysics, and who are familiar with the
latest revolutionary discoveries in all the realms of thought, have
endeavored to overthrow Dualism by using the most improved
weapons at their command. What are the results of the great battle
to date? Is Dualism dead and buried, doomed to everlasting dis-
honor? Or has the terrific assault, frontal and other, failed, and
Dualism still stands intact and solid?
Professor Lovejoy is satisfied that the attack on dualism has
failed. The philosopher, he thinks, is bound to admit that Animal
Faith, as Santayana would put it, or Common sense, as Professor
Lovejoy would say, is still amply justified in adhering to the em-
pirical idea of an objective world, with Man as part of it in a sense,
yet a part capable of thought, of feeling, of judging, of contemplat-
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ing the rest of creation subjectively, of looking- even into his own
inner self.
Nothing to be found in the works of Russell, Eddington, White-
head. Jeans and other acute and profound contemporary thinkers.
Professor Lovejoy affirms, and successfully shows, has undermined
Dualism.
We may resolve matter and apparent objects into mere events;
we mav hold that the same process or phenomenon is physical at
one end and mental at the other ; we may say that the stuff of the
Universe is neutral, or insist that it is mental. We may follow the
new physics, the new metaphysics and the new psychology bravely
to their revolutionary conclusions, but we have not disposed of
Dualism, according to Professor Lovejoy. Relativity, indetermin-
ism, uncertainty and doubt as to the relations between causes and
effects, two-way time, and other startling developments in science
and philosophy have perhaps obscured and complicated the issue,
but it remains a stubborn fact as an issue, and must be faced by
philosophers in a co-operative spirit.
Professor Lovejoy himself gives us a fine example of that spirit.
He is not dogmatic, despite the irresistible logic of his argument at
more than one vital stage. He is tentative and he briefly summarizes
his own views in the form of modest observations.
There are those who hold that to criticise the revolt against
dualism and convict the insurgents of inconsistency, confusion of
thought, use of identical terms in various conflicting senses, is to
repudiate Monism as well. Put Professor Lovejoy has no quarrel
with Monism properly defined and correctly understood.
The essence of Monism is the idea that the Universe is governed
by one set of laws, and that its ultimate nature is single. That this
has not been fully and conclusively established, is of course incon-
testable, but neither has an ultimate and essential Dualism been
proved. Certain attempts at proof have been made by both sides,
and it is Professor Lovejoy's task to show the inadequacy of the
cause against Dualism in sundry forms.
Let us grant for the sake of the argument that he is wholly suc-
cessful. Let us admit that no one has yet demonstrated the unity
of the mental and the physical. What of this? It certainly does not
follow that mind and matter never meet, never merge into something
different from each, or that the laws governing the one have no
application to the other.
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Professor Lovejoy divides his analysis and review into two parts.
The first phase of the revolt is traced to William James and G. E.
Moore and the second to the alleged implications of twentieth cen-
tury science. The conclusion or the verdict is rather Not Proven
than For the Defendant, Dualism.
Philosophy has been warned by thinkers like Whitehead and
Russell against leaving common sense and practical reason too far
behind their abstractions. Naive realism is as impossible to re-
flective minds as naive idealism. But dualism is not synonymous
with naive realism. Dualism proves that inference plays a large
part in our apprehension, and no psychologist can deny this. But
it does not take us very far.
Science can prove to the average man that the table or desk at
which he sits is not as round or flat or green as he thinks it is. A
few tests, instruments and demonstrations will convince him that
his impressions are misleading. But he cannot be convinced that,
when he turns his chair to the window, the table or desk vanishes
into thin air, simply because he does not see it for the moment. He
cannot be convinced by any strained subtleties that his friend in
another part of the world does not exist when he does not see him
or hear his voice over the telephone, or read a letter signed by him.
And there is no reason why he should be. The distinction between
subject and object is given, and there is no arguing it away. We
cannot really think that there is no external world. But we do not
know just what that world is.
There is, however, a constant action and reaction between the
subject and object. Each somehow and in some degree colors and
conditions the other. This undeniable fact makes for a Monistic
interpretation—as far as it goes.
Again, it is perfectly plain that a given phenomenon may be
physical at one end and mental at the other. And some phenomena
are both physical and mental at the same time. This, too. is sug-
gestive of a Monistic view of nature.
Yet these lines of argument or evidence are not incompatible
with a critical and tentative realism.
Professor Lovejoy has rendered a real service to philosophy
and to clear thinking generally by his thoroughgoing but very fair
and sympathetic survey of the great and protracted controversy over
Dualism. He is not constructive in this work. But he has cleared
the atmosphere : he has defined the terms of the problem ; he has
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disposed of fallacious explanations which leave the central issue
unexplained. Let us hope that other philosophers as well equipped
and as dispassionate as Professor Lovejoy will perform similar
services for other unsolved problems in modern philosophy. The
time fro a new synthesis is not perhaps at hand, but philosophers
should understand one another better than they have done in the
past, and they should agree, at least, upon statements of fact and
definitions.
Meantime Professor Albert Einstein, of Relativity fame, has
announced further discoveries in physics which may greatly
strengthen the case for Monism. 1 le is working on formulas which,
he hopes, will demonstrate the unity of all cosmic phenomena. Al-
ready he has correlated electricity and magnetism. He has also re-
vised his original conception of space. He now regards it as
primary, and matter as secondary. Space, he says, is devouring
matter. What the genius of Newton began in interpreting space
and giving it a physical character, Professor Einstein may finish
by revolutionizing our ideas of space and matter alike. Thus what
the new physics has failed to do, as Professor Lovejoy shows, it
may yet achieve in the not distant future.
Philosophy and metaphysics have been admonished bv Dr. Dewey
and others not to sever their organic tie with science. In the dis-
cussion of Dualism, it is particularly important to keep one eve on
the exact sciences. It will doubtless be their good fortune to give
dualism the coup de grace.
II.— The J 'aiii Quest for Certainty
Professor John Dewey, in his Gilford lectures, essayed a task of
broader and bolder scope, but one that incidentally touches the par-
ticular problem dealt with by Professor Lovejoy. The lectures
made a deep impression in England, where the instrumentalist
theory of knowledge is not as well known as it is in this country.
To Americans the ideas expressed by Mr. Dewey are not novel, and
his method of approach has long been familiar to them, but even
they will find the book in question, entitled The Quest for Certainty,
highly profitable.
Professor Dewey does not hesitate to attack what he considers
a vice common to all schools of philosophy, ancient and modern
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namelv, the assumption that thought and action are two distinct
categories, and that certainty exists even if imperfect and mal-
adjusted human beings have not as yet managed to discover it and
make it their firm and cherished possession.
Professor Dewey pleads for a revolutionary reconstruction in
philosophy—not only in its methods but in its aims and objectives.
He does not want philosophy to continue a vain quest. Certainty
is not to be had for the asking or thinking ; the only thing certain is
the instrumental and experimental method.
Professor Dewey repudiates the notion that the world of thought
is radically different from that of action. Moreover, he contends,
we do not seek knowledge merely for the sake of action. Knowing
is continuous with action ; he who thinks and knows is an active
participator inside the natural and human drama. There is nothing
antecedent or fixed in human affairs ; we must inquire, observe, test
and compare, to be sure, but knowledge implies action, change of
conditions, adaptation of ends to means and means to ends. We
make our own world by thought and action, and we never achieve
perfection. We cannot use our thought to escape the world in which
we find ourselves. There are no Eternal Forms or Final Truths
;
there are problems to solve by means of thought and of its applica-
tions. We may remove obstacles, clear up doubts here and there,
improve our conditions, create a better world, our own point of
view furnishing the standard of goodness, but our standard is itself
subject to change in a world full of contingency and uncertainty.
Professor Dewey finds that the assumption of a certainty to be
reached by thought plays havoc in politics, in economics, in ethics
as well as in metaphysics, religion and philosophy. 1 le endeavors to
illustrate this proposition and to trace the evil consequences of the
error in every department of human activity and human thought.
Not all his illustrations are apt. The individualist will take vigorous
exception to his assumption that the school of Laisses Faire in
economics postulated the existence of fixed laws which men must
discover and obey without demur. What the individualists, from
Adam Smith down to Spencer and his disciples have maintained is
that an "invisible hand" reconciles superficially conflicting com-
mercial interests ; that competition in a fair field is better than state
monopoly or bureaucratic control of industry, and that liberty is the
mother of order and harmony.
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Now, all this may be true or it may be false. But the appeal of
those who call themselves individualists is to experience, to com-
mon sense, to scientific generalization, not to any eternal principle
of right.
Dr. Dewey is bound to find instances in support of his theory
even where they do not exist. But even if we reject all doubtful
illustrations, enough remains to prove the assertion that philosophers
have divorced the world of action from that of thought and con-
templation. And modern psychology supports the Dewey view of
the unit\' of thought and action, with all the important deductions
which he makes in the realm of philosophy.
The truth is, we do not know when or where thought ceases and
action begins. We do not even know whether thought is not, as
some Behaviorists assert, a form of action. We do not understand
the process of thought ; and can only analyze certain conditions or
phases of thought. But we do know that action aids and stimulates
thought, gives it purpose and direction. It would revivify certain
schools of philosophy wonderfully if it could free itself of the vice
pointed out by Dr. Dewey and make a fresh start from the new
basis.
The instrumentalist theory has its limitations, no doubt, but
these would be better understood under the Dewey concept of
knowledge than they are now. Let vis see how far that concept will
carry us before complaining of its inadequacy and seeking to modify
it. Certain it is that it would brush aside a number of unreal or
paradoxical problems in philosophy and permit concentration, in the
cooperative way favored by Professor Lovejoy, upon the real and
legitimate problems of that department of human intellectual
activity.
